Action prediction can act as an effective agency cue modulating the amount of self–other integration in joint action. These findings suggest social agency can be induced and effectively measured in joint action. predictable) during joint task performance. The joint Simon effect was decreased when the co-actor’s actions were unpredictable (vs. Vicarious agency could effectively be induced, but did not modulate the size of the joint Simon effect. For this purpose, we manipulated experienced agency by varying the experienced control over a co-actor’s actions (Experiment 1), and action prediction regarding the co-actor’s actions (Experiment 2).
In this study, we aimed to extend this line of research by testing whether experiencing agency over a co-actor’s actions (vicarious agency) and/or action prediction strengthens the joint Simon effect. Previous research suggests that such self–other integration (indexed by the joint Simon effect) is enhanced by agent similarity of the co-actor (e.g., high in intentionality). People often coordinate actions with others, requiring an adjustable amount of self–other integration between actor’s and co-actor’s actions. Yet, although there is evidence to suggest that agentic characteristics of the co-actor enhance the extent of self-other integration, to our knowledge there has been no research on the effect of experiencing oneself to be the agent of one's co-actor's actions. Also, people typically show stronger self-other integration when their co-actor (whether they are other people, robots, or objects) is more (like themselves) perceived as intentional (Atmaca et al., 2011 Müller et al., 2015 Stenzel et al., 2012), high in agency (Stenzel et al., 2014), as belonging to the same group (Aquino et al., 2015 Costantini & Ferri, 2013 McClung et al., 2013 or being in cooperation (Hommel et al., 2009 Iani et al., 2011Iani et al.,, 2014 Liepelt & Raab, 2021). That is, action integration is typically stronger when people have to coordinate their own (e.g., left and right hand) actions (i.e., standard Simon effect) compared to when they have to coordinate their actions with the actions of others (i.e., joint Simon effect/self-other integration). In line with predictions of metacontrol state theory, our study indicated that abstract cognitive goal states can be transferred from one task to another task, able to affect the degree of bodily self-other integration across different task situations. Both effects (metacontrol state induction and shared experience) seem to be statistically independent of each other. When experiencing the goal induction together with the partner, the joint Simon effect was significantly decreased as when the induction was performed alone. The joint Simon effect for participants being in a competitive state was significantly smaller than for participants being in a cooperative state. We found significant joint Simon effects for participants who were in a competitive state and for participants who were in a cooperative state. Before running this joint Simon task, we set both participants either in a competitive or a cooperative control state by means of a dyadic game, a manipulation aimed at testing possible goal transfer across tasks. Two participants shared a visual Simon task, so that each person basically performed complementary parts of the task, which transfers the paradigm into a go/no-go Simon task for each person. In addition, and more exploratory the study tested if this effect depends on a shared group experience with the partner. Using a social variant of the standard two-choice Simon task, this study aims to test if competitive/cooperative processing modes (i.e., metacontrol states) change the degree of bodily self-other integration between two persons in joint action. In most of our daily activities and in team sports, we interact with other individuals and do not act in isolation.
0 kommentar(er)
